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Arthur Pearson Crofton		 Display Descendants of
Arthur Pearson Crofton		 GD005477    Contact contributor     Contributor Number: 32
Born 15/12/1880 at Dublin, Ireland
Died 09/03/1949 at Johannesburg, South Africa
Father: Richard Arthur Pearson Crofton
Mother: Charlotte Elizabeth Brereton
Married Annie (Cissie) Elizabeth Bell 1914
Children.

Notes: Ussher of Campshire, Co Waterford - Ussher - Family History ... boards.ancestry.com.au › Surnames › Ussher? Nov 19, 2001 - 8 posts - ?2 authors Their second son was Arthur Pearson Crofton who married Annie Elizabeth B ell. They moved to South Africa. My family are still in South Africa ... DEPOT KAB SOURCE 3/CT TYPE LEER VOLUME_NO 4/2/1/3/479 SYSTEM 01 REFERENCE B1004 PART 1 DESCRIPTION RE: PROPOSED RESIDENCE, MAITLAND ROAD, MOWBRAY, AP C ROFTON. STARTING 1932 ENDING 1932 The 2nd Battalion sailed on the Dilwara on 2nd December 1899 and arri ved on 25th December. Along with the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, the 1st S outh Lancashire Regiment, and the 1st York and Lancaster Regiment, they f ormed the 11th Brigade under Major General Woodgate, and part of the Vt h Division under Sir Charles Warren. Two battalions of the 10th Brigade, the 2nd Royal Warwicks and the 1s t Yorkshire Regiment, were left in Cape Colony, and the remainder of th e division disembarked at Durban in order to take part in the relief of L adysmith. At the time of their arrival the operations were at a standsti ll, Colenso having been fought on 15th December, and General Buller bein g unable to do anything until the reinforcements arrived. Sir Charles Warren's division was taken to Frere as the battalions ar rived, and on 10th January 1900 he set out from Frere to Springfield. Th e operations undertaken between 18th and 22nd January are briefly set for th under the 2nd Queen's (Royal West Surrey), —the 2nd Brigade, of whic h that regiment formed a part, having also been put under Sir Charles War ren. In the actions about Venter's Spruit on the 19th, 20th, and 21st Janu ary the 11th Brigade was on the British right. On those dates the King' s Own had no very heavy fighting, although other battalions of the brigad e had serious casualties. On the 20th, when the fighting was very sever e on the right centre, the brigade headquarters, with the 2nd King's Ow n and the 1st South Lancashire Regiment, were with the artillery, six bat teries, which were massed on or about Three-Tree Hill, south-west of Spio n Kop. Roughly the Boer position was two sides of a square: one side Brakfon tein and Vaal Krantz, facing southeast towards Potgeiter's Drift and Spea rman's Hill, still held by General Lyttelton; the other side facing south -west towards Warren's lines. Spion Kop, a high hill, lay at the angle o f the two sides. On the 22nd it was decided that Spion Kop must be taken. Next day i t was reconnoitred, but chiefly on the south-east side, that being the po rtion of the hill which could not be seen from the other Boer positions . At 7 pm General Woodgate decided to assault from the south - west face , and Colonel Thorneycroft, of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, had barel y time to ride out and note some landmarks in the dusk. About 10.30 pm General Woodgate marched from the rendezvous, near War ren's chief camp. His force was the 2nd Royal Lancaster, six companies o f the Lancashire Fusiliers, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, 180 men an d 18 officers, and a half-company Royal Engineers, supported by two compa nies Connaught Rangers and the newly arrived Imperial Light Infantry, a N atal raised corps. Unofficial accounts, including that of Mr Oppenheim , state that two companies of the South Lancashire Regiment formed part o f the attacking force, and this is evidently correct, judging by the casu alties. When the troops, now extended in line, were near the crest the y were challenged. As arranged before hand, they at once lay down and th e Boers fired. When Colonel Thorneycroft thought that the magazines of t he Boer rifles had been emptied he gave the command to charge. This wa s done, and about 4 am the crest was carried. The Boers fled. About te n of our men were wounded up to this time. General Woodgate ordered a trench and breastworks to be made. The da rkness and a heavy mist made it impossible "to get the exact crest fo r a good field of fire". The rocky ground and a want of proper tools add ed to the difficulties; however, a shallow trench about 200 yards long wa s dug and occupied by the Royal Lancaster, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantr y, and the Lancashire Fusiliers. There was some intermittent rifle - fir ing through the mist, and before it lifted, men who had been pushed forwa rd found that the trench did not command the ascent, there being much dea d ground not 200 yards away. About 8 am the mist cleared, and the enem y then commenced to pour in that awful shell and rifle fire which was t o last throughout the whole day. It was now seen that Spion Kop was no t the commanding feature it was thought to be, but that it was itself com manded by several mountains which had been intrenched and fortified by th e enemy. The trench which had been made by General Woodgate's men was fo und to be of little use, and troops had to be taken forward by rushes, an d lying down near the edge of the plateau, they had there to use what cov er they could find. Many most gallant attempts were made to hold patche s of rocks. Often all the officers and men in these advanced positions w ere killed or wounded. This happened over and over again throughout th e day. Between 8.30 and 9 am General Woodgate was mortally wounded. Lie utenant Blake Knox states that after receiving his wound the general orde red a signal message to be sent to Sir Charles Warren to the effect, "W e are between a terrible cross - fire and can barely hold our own. Wate r is badly needed. Help us". This message is mentioned by Mr Oppenhei m also, but is not mentioned in the White Book, and may never have been r eceived. Mr Blake Knox's statement is valuable, however, as showing tha t the general was convinced at that early hour of the great difficulty w e should have in holding the hill. Colonel Thorneycroft, in his report o f 26th January 1900, mentions that when General Woodgate was wounded Colo nel Blomfield of the Lancashire Fusiliers assumed command, but he too wa s shortly after wounded. About 10.30 Colonel Crofton, who is said by M r Oppenheim and Mr Blake Knox to have assumed command, sent off a messag e to General Warren, via the headquarters' signallers at Swartz Kop. Muc h controversy has raged over the exact words. Colonel Crofton and Captai n Martin said the words were, "General Woodgate killed, reinforcements ur gently required". General Warren says that as received the words were, " Reinforce at once or all lost, general dead". It matters little which i s correct, as the latter statement was absolutely justified, and it is un likely that had the wording been as claimed by Colonel Crofton there woul d have been any difference in General Buller's decision to put Colonel Th orneycroft in command. To blame Colonel Crofton or Captain Martin for no t writing the message is too ridiculous. Thorneycroft about 12.30 receiv ed a message from General Warren that he was to take command, the messeng er being shot dead while delivering the order. Throughout the whole da y the men on the left held their advanced line, but on the right and in t he centre not only was the remnant of the advanced line driven in, but th at part of the trench was for a time vacated. Colonel Thorneycroft says : "The Boers closed in on the right and centre. Some men of mixed regime nts at right end of trench got up and put up their hands; three or four B oers came out and signalled their comrades to advance. I was the only of ficer in the trench on the left, and I got up and shouted to the leader o f the Boers that I was the commandant and that there was no surrender. I n order not to get mixed up in any discussion I called on all men to foll ow me, and retired to some rocks farther back. The Boers opened a heav y fire on us. On reaching the rocks I saw a company of the Middlesex Reg iment advancing. I collected them up to the rocks, and ordered all to ad vance again. This the men did, and we reoccupied the trench and crest li ne in front". The other accounts do fuller justice to Thorneycroft's ow n splendid bravery and determination. During the afternoon reinforcements arrived, first the Infantry, an d the 2nd Scottish Rifles, — the latter coming from Potgeiter's and ascen ding the southern slope. Again a wretched discussion arose as to who sho uld command. However, Colonel Thorneycroft remained at least practicall y in command. Before 10 am General Warren had wired to General Lyttelton, "Give eve ry assistance you can on your side". General Lyttelton at once sent of f Bethune's Mounted Infantry, two squadrons; the 2nd Scottish Rifles an d the 3rd King's Royal Rifles,—the first two to report themselves at th e top of Spion Kop, but on the extreme right, and the King's Royal Rifle s to scale a lofty peak, or rather two peaks, north-east of Spion Kop. T hese orders were splendidly carried out, the King's Royal Rifles doing ma gnificent work, getting to the top of the hill and capturing the peaks . General Lyttelton seems to have become unnecessarily nervous about hi s people, because at 3 pm he signalled to the King's Royal Rifles, "Retir e steadily till further orders". At 3.30 and 4.50 these messages were re peated, the latter by messenger; but, fortunately for all parties, the me ssages were not received, for at 6 pm the officer commanding the King's R oyal Rifles signalled, "We are on top of hill. Unless I get orders to re tire I shall stay here"; but "Retire when dark" came back. This messag e was sent off at 6 pm. Half an hour later General Lyttelton received fr om General Warren a wire saying, "The assistance you are giving most valu able. We shall try to remain in statu quo during to-morrow". Colonel Th orneycroft does not say whether he knew that the King's Royal Rifles wer e to withdraw; the point seems to be of very great importance if he is t o be blamed for retiring. The evacuation by our people of a hill, the po ssession of which was important, if not vital, to the defence of Spion Ko p, was not an encouragement to men who had borne such a burden as had fal len to the devoted band on the bullet-and-shell-swept plateau that day . During the afternoon the Boers had not again attempted to rush the pla teau, and their rifle-fire had slackened a little, but their shell-fire w as heavier than ever. Mr Oppenheim states that seven shells per minute f ell for a time. At 2.30 Colonel Thorneycroft sent a message to Sir Charles Warren t o the effect that the enemy's guns were sweeping the whole top, asking wh at further reinforcements could be sent "to hold the hill to-night", tha t water was badly needed. In a postscript he added, "If you wish to real ly make a certainty of hill for night you must send more infantry and att ack enemy's guns". At 6.30 Colonel Thorneycroft again wrote Sir Charle s Warren, "The troops which marched up here last night are quite done u p ... They have had no water, and ammunition is running short". After st ating that he 'thought' it impossible to permanently hold the hill as lon g as "the enemy's guns can play on it", he requested instructions, and wo und up, "The situation is critical" . Up till dark Colonel Thorneycroft seems to have had no answer to an y of these messages. After dark—the hour is uncertain, and is variousl y given, but probably about eight—he states that he consulted officers co mmanding the Royal Lancaster and Scottish Rifles. These agreed that th e hill was untenable, and some time after the troops were drawn in and ma rched off. Mr Oppenheim says Colonel Thorneycroft came round the trenche s on the crest as late as 11 pm and then said the men were to go down. When one considers the heroic conduct of the officers and men on th e hill, including always the King's Royal Rifles on the twin peaks, one i s struck by the apparent lack of interest displayed by General Warren. H e has been severely criticised by his chiefs, and one is forced to thin k criticism was justified. Apart from purely military or tactical questi ons—such as, "Was everything possible done by Hart's and Hildyard's men t o relieve the awful pressure on the Kop?" "Was every possible step take n at the earliest possible moment to ensure that the hill would be made s afe as soon as darkness set in and the defenders relieved?"—ordinary comm on-sense demanded that Sir Charles should have at least come to the botto m of or partly up the hill, so that he could communicate by messenger mor e quickly with those on the top. Ordinary feeling demanded that he shoul d have given Colonel Thorneycroft every encouragement to hold on by recit ing what was being done to ensure the safety of the hill at night, if any thing practical was being done, and it should not have been left to a cha nce messenger (Mr Churchill) to volunteer to go to the top. Mr Churchil l was twice up,—once at dusk, once after dark. When he arrived the secon d time Colonel Thorneycroft had already decided to retire. For the withdrawal of the King's Royal Rifles Sir Charles Warren cann ot be blamed, and as that order was given from near Potgeiter's, one woul d imagine that General Buller approved of its being sent. The point is n ot brought out in the despatches, but it is important. Lieutenant Blak e Knox says l that when taken a prisoner by the Boers on the 25th he lear ned that they were greatly disheartened by our capture of the twin peaks , that they considered these the key to the position, as, if the Boers re gained the Kop, they in turn would be enfiladed by our men on the peaks . Various writers on the Boer side who were present have expressed the s ame view; while our own people at Ladysmith say they saw preparations fo r retiral being made by the Boers, so far confirming these views. In hi s statement to the War Commission Sir Charles Warren suggested that the w ithdrawal of the King's Royal Rifles from the twin peaks was done by orde r of Sir Redvers Buller, and that that withdrawal may have caused Major T horneycroft to decide upon the evacuation of Spion Kop. When the histor y of Spion Kop is written the question of the peaks cannot be left out o f account. The British losses on the 24th are set down at 28 officers an d 175 men killed, 34 officers and 520 men wounded, 6 officers and 280 me n missing. Some of the missing were undoubtedly killed. The Royal Lanca sters lost 3 officers and at least 34 men killed, 4 officers and over 10 0 men wounded, 1 officer and about 50 men missing. In his despatch of 30 th January 1900 (White Book, p 24) Sir Redvers Buller "bears testimony t o the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops", and says, "the Roya l Lancasters fought gallantly". After retiring across the Tugela to Spearman's Camp General Buller ga ve his men a few days' rest before making his next attempt at Vaal Krantz . On the 5th February that attempt was begun. It will be remembered tha t the Lancashire Brigade, now under General Wynne, demonstrated against t he Boer left at Brakfontein, while the real attack was developed opposit e Vaal Krantz by General Lyttelton. The Lancashire Brigade did their par t very well. Their losses were not heavy. The 2nd Royal Lancaster and South Lancashire Regiment took part in th e fighting between 13th and 27th February, the other two battalions bein g left to guard the bridge at Springfield and other points. On the 22n d General Wynne, whose brigade for the time being was the 2nd Royal Lanca ster, 1st South Lancashire, and the Rifle Reserve Battalion, endeavoure d to capture hills east of Grobelar's and north of Onderbrook Spruit. I n this the brigade had very severe fighting, the South Lancashire Regimen t being the first line. That day General Wynne was wounded and the briga de lost its second brigadier. The York and Lancasters arrived at Colenso on the 27th, and the thre e regiments, along with the West Yorks, were put under Colonel Kitchener , and took part in the final and successful assault on the works betwee n Railway Hill and Terrace Hill, and on the latter hill itself (see 2nd Q ueen's). "General Kitchener's Brigade . . . gained the railway cutting. H e then directed the West Yorkshire and the Royal Lancaster Regiments to a ttack Railway Hill; but the men of the latter, seeing the main position , Terrace Hill on their left front, went straight at it, and were stoppe d by a heavy fire from the sangars in the valley. General Kitchener at o nce remedied the mistake and directed the South Lancashire on the right o f the Royal Lancaster, between them and the West Yorkshire, who were the n gaining the crest of Railway Hill. The South Lancashire pressed forwar d and, aided by the artillery-fire, captured the sangars in the valley, t aking a few prisoners and killing many of the enemy ... The sangars in t he valley were soon taken, though, I regret to say, at the cost of the li fe of Colonel M'Carthy O'Leary, who fell while gallantly leading his regi ment; and the Royal Lancaster and South Lancashire, pressing on, well sup ported by the York and Lancaster on the right and the 4th Brigade on th e left, soon gained the summit of the hill and the day was won". Between 13th and 27th February the Royal Lancaster lost 2 officers an d 28 men killed, and 8 officers and 145 men wounded. Three officers and 18 men were mentioned in despatches by General Bul ler for exceptional gallantry in the relief operations. Two men were rec ommended for the distinguished conduct medal for conspicuous gallantry o n Spion Kop. When General Buller attacked the Boer position north of Ladysmith th e Vth Division, now under Hildyard, marched up the railway or by the dire ct road, not taking part in the turning movement by Helpmakaar. In the c apture of Botha's Pass the 10th Brigade took and occupied Van Wyk's Hil l (see 2nd Queen's and 2nd Middlesex), and the 2nd Brigade and the 11th o r Lancashire Brigade carried the pass itself, both brigades doing admirab le work. A few days afterwards, on 11th June, there was a stiff battle a t Alleman's Nek, in which the 2nd and 10th Brigades did the active work , the 11th being with the baggage and in support. After the Laing's Nek position was turned and the Natal-Pretoria lin e occupied, the 11th Brigade were largely employed in taking and afterwar ds in garrisoning the Wakkerstroom-Vryheid-Utrecht district, a very troub lesome and difficult piece of country. In his final despatch of 9th November 1900 General Buller mentione d 5 officers and 3 men of the battalion; and in Lord Roberts' final despa tch 8 officers and 16 non-commissioned officers and men gained mention. On 11th December 1900 the enemy fiercely attacked Vryheid, but were d riven off with heavy loss. The garrison was composed of the 2nd Royal La ncaster and 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers Mounted Infantry. Colonel Gawne an d another officer and 3 men were killed and 14 wounded. An outpost of ab out 35 men with an officer were surprised at the beginning of the attac k and the party were taken prisoners. On the 19th of the same month the York and Lancaster was engaged at W ooldrift, and often during the ensuing nine months some part of the briga de had fighting. On 26th September 1901 the Mounted Infantry of the Vth Division gaine d great glory at Fort Itala and Fort Prospect. It will be remembered tha t General Louis Botha had massed his forces in the south-east of the Tran svaal for another great effort to invade Natal. On 17th September he amb ushed and destroyed Major Gough's force of 200 Mounted Infantry, chiefl y of the 4th Brigade with a few South Lancashire. Botha then moved again st the two forts. At Itala the garrison was two guns 69th EFA, three com panies Mounted Infantry, and one maxim. The Boers under Botha, Opperman , and others numbered between 1800 and 2000 men. Immediately after twelv e midnight, 25th and 26th, the attack commenced, and continued with littl e cessation until 7.30 PM, when the Boers drew off defeated and discourag ed. Our losses were 1 officer and 21 men killed, 5 officers and 54 men w ounded; those of the Royal Lancaster being 3 men killed and 8 wounded. At Fort Prospect the garrison was composed of 35 men of the Dorset Mo unted Infantry and 51 of the Durham Militia Artillery. The Boers numbere d about 500. The attack commenced at 4.30 am on the 26th, and lasted thi rteen hours. Here again the Boers were driven off with heavy loss. In his despatch of 8th October 1901 Lord Kitchener said, "The success ful defence of these two places reflects the greatest credit on Major Cha pman and Captain Rowley, and on all ranks of the small garrisons under th eir respective commands". Several commendations in despatches came to th e battalion for very gallant work on this occasion; and in Lord Kitchener 's final despatch 4 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers and men wer e mentioned. http://angloboerwar.com/units%20imperial/royal_lancs_regt.htm